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Article 6

RECENT CASE NOTES
GrFT-BANx DEPosrrs-DEmy-One, J. Perrish deposited $1,000 in

the Tri-State bank of Fort Wayne, Indiana, and caused the deposit slip to
be issued payable to one Leo Perrish or Delta Caywood. Thereupon Leo
Perrish went to the home of Delta Caywood and told her that upon his
death she should get the $1,000 which was on deposit in their joint names
at the bank. The bank was also notified of Leo's desires. L. Perrish had
the deposit slip among his effects at death and the executor claims the sum
by virtue of non-delivery of the slip. In the action D. Caywood contended
(1) that the bank held the deposit as trustee for her benefit, (2) and that
there was also a valid gift inter vivos to her. Held, there was not delivery
of the deposit slip sufficient to create a gift inter vivos nor had the bank
been made the agent of the donee. The donor had not parted with title or
control of the deposit, essential to a gift. Also the attempted gift did not
create a trust. First & Tri-State National Bank v. Caywood, Indiana Appellate Court, 1931, 176 N. E. 871.
The decision of the instant case in view of the general principles of the
law of gifts is correct. Turpin Adm. v. Stringer, 228 Ky. 32, 142 S. W.
189; Edson v. Lucas, 40 Fed. (2) 398; Eseher v. Steers, 10 Fed. (2) 739;
Ross v. Watkins, 82 Ind. App. 487; Gammon v. Robbins, 128 Ind. 85; Reasn
v. Bohne, 76 Ind. App. 114, 123 N. E. 490.
Granting, as a matter of fact, to facilitate discussion, that a bank deposit is a subject of gift inter vivos, were the other requirements present in
the instant case to create a legal gift inter vivos? The Indiana cases reiterate the accepted rule that before a gift inter vivos can be created there
must be a delivery or parting with control over the subject matter coupled
with both the present intention to give control to the donee and an acceptance
by the donee. Daubenspeck v. Briggs, 71 Ind. 255; Smith v. Dorsey, 38 Ind.
451, 10 Am. St. Rep. 118; Smith v. Ferguson, 90 Ind. 229; Bingham v.
Stage, 123 Ind. 281; Goelz v. People Savings Bank, 31 Ind. 67.
Consideration of acceptance is unnecessary for as a general rule acceptance by the donee is presumed if the gift is beneficial to the donee; and
a refusal to accept amounts to a condition subsequent invalidating the gift.
Dunlop v. Dunlop, 94 Mich. 11, 53 N. W. 788; Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y.
421; Diefendorf v. Diefendorf, 132 N. Y. 100, 30 N. E. 375. The donor's
proper intent to create a gift inter vivos is sometimes rather difficult to
define, but, on the whole, there should appear very clearly the desire to give
up control immediately, to put the subject matter in control of the donee
or some one for him, and to pass the legal title to him. Does this intent
appear in the instant case? It can not be disputed that the donor, as is
indicated by the evidence, expressed not only that he intended the gift to
become effective "at his death" but that he would keep control, as he had
in the past, until his death. None of the elements of proper intent is present, so most courts would agree that no gift inter vivos was created.
Turpin Adm. v. Stringer, 228 Ky. 32, 14 (2) S. W. 189, and authorities to
paragraph two.
Delivery is the chief requisite of a gift because, first, it carries with it
an indication of the donor's intent; second, it presents an objective test by
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which the transfer of control and title may be detected; third, it gives the
donee something as prima facie evidence of the transaction in his favor.
Assuming again that a bank deposit is a good subject of gift inter vivos,
can sufficient delivery be found in the principle case to satisfy the legal
requirement set out in the accepted definition supra? At the time of his
statement the donor did not relinquish his right to the sum on deposit, but
instead he remained a joint creditor and intended to so remain until his
death. He kept all the rights which he formerly had in connection with the
deposits; and, as a consequence, they were so much within his control that
it is absurd to say that there was any sort of delivery or relinquishment of
control sufficient to create a gift. On the factual situation in the instant
case the result relative to delivery at least is with the weight of authority
although there is some authority contra. Castle v. Persons, 117 Fed. 853,
54 C. C. A. 133; Ebel v. Piehl, 134 Mich. 64; Dinslage v. Stratman, 105 Neb.
274; Ogden v. Washington National Bank, 82 Ind. App. 187, 145 N. E. 514.
Historically, in Brackton's time, delivery of possession was essential to
the transfer of ownership of a chattel either by way of gift or of sale.
Pollock & Maitland, History of the English Law (2 ed.) 180. Williston
points out that the tendency toward the strict requirements in the law of
gifts is a hangover from the law of property. Williston on Contracts (4 ed.)
No. 1386. But the strictly formal requirements of physical delivery have
been gradually weakened to accommodate cases of symbolic delivery not
only where there is in the possession of the donee some incorporeal chattel
as evidence of a corporeal chattel, Williston on Contracts, (4 ed.) No. 439;
but where the donee is already in possession of the chattel, Allen v. Cowan,
23 N. Y. 502, 80 Am. Dec. 316, Tenbrook v. Broum, 17 Ind. 410, or where
physical delivery is impractical or impossible, Gray v. Barton, 55 N. Y. 68.
Does this mean that in the continuation of the development in the law
of gifts delivery will approach the point of being disregarded? If such
were the trend of the law, a gift could be created by the mere expression
of intention; but the question arises whether or not the law should for
expediency or practical purposes ever reach this state. It is not disputed
that at common law a promise to give under seal was enforceable. Mitchel
v. Williamson, 6 Md. 210; Hanna v. McKenue, 5 Mon. B. 314, 43 Am. Dec.
122; Storm v. United States, 94 U. S. 576, 548; Wing v. Chase, 35 Me. 265.
But it never has been the law that there would be enforcement of a
mere promise to give in the future, whether oral or in writing, not under
seal. Harmon v. James, 7 Ind. 263; Johnson v. Griest, 85 Ind. 503; Allen
v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 119, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517; Heffersteins Estate, 77 Pa.
St. 328, 18 Am. Rep. 449; Powell v. Steward, 17 Ala. 772; Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N. J. L. 383, 20 Am. St. Rep. 399; Cox v. Sprigg, 6 Md. 274. The
effect of the seal has been abrogated considerably either by statute or interpretation of the courts. In view of this fact it has been urged that if a
promise, sealed and delivered, is given full legal effect, and if the effect
of the seal has been reduced to insignificance, then, in effect, the enforcement of a promise under seal is the same as enforcing a promise in writing.
Others argue that it was intended, in reducing the seal to unimportance,
to make all enforceable writings comply with the strict requirements set
out in the law of writings not under seal, instead of the less strict law of
sealed writings with which it has always been easier for the parties to
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comply. The advocates of this latter reasoning conclude that promises in
writing, whether under seal or otherwise, should not be given effect unless
they comply with the requirements set out in the law of writings not under
seal. See 72 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 391, 395-96; Pound, An Introduction to the
Philosophy of the Law, 276, 282. The Restatement by the American Law
Institute has accepted the doctrine that a mere promise alone without something more will not be given legal effect. Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Ch. 3, Sec. 75. Since the present status of the law seems to be that
a naked promise will not be enforced in the law of contracts, dqes it necessarily follow by analogy that there should be no enforcement of an oral
or written promise to give in the law of gifts?
Evidence of oral conversations or contemporaneous acts were always
admissible to establish a gift. Bragg v. Massie, 38 Ala. 39, 79 Am. Dec. 82.
If such oral evidence were alone sufficient to establish a gift inter vivos
without some tangible transfer of the property, there would be opened a
gateway for the perjuring of witnesses, our courts will be filled with unnecessary litigation between parties one of whom thinks he can prove a
promise to himself from the other, and the judicial system will be embarrassed with a chaotic and unworkable law of gifts. To enforce a written
promise to give would not be so objectionable, because, in a written promise,
there would be some tangible evidence of the donor's desire; but as a matter
of law, disregarding the statute of Frauds, there has never been given
greater effect to a written promise than to an oral one, Restatement of
Contracts, Ch. 7, 157, so the writer sees no necessity in the present law of
gifts to justify greater effect to a written promise to give than to an oral
one. There should be some objective transfer of relinquishment of control
by the donor to insure that the donor desired to give, and there should be
some objective receipt of that delivery or control by the donee, or some one
for him, to insure that the donee is entitled to the gift. Thus each party
has the guarantee that his right will be more fully protected because an
objective test, as used in the instant case, affords an easier way of determining that the donor's rights ended and that the donee's arose. The present requirements of delivery, it would seem, are founded not only on the
grounds of public policy and convenience, but also to prevent fraud, mistake, perjury, and imposition on the courts. See 18 Ky. L. Rev. 80.
It might be contended that there was a gift on condition in the principle
case, but for the purposes, of this note it is sufficient to say that the phrase
"at my death" would appear to be a condition precedent and the authorities
generally agree that there can never be a gift created on a condition precedent, although valid gifts may be created on a condition subsequent. Irish
v. Nutting, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 370; In Re Humphreys Estate, 191 App. Div.
291, 181 N. Y. S. 169; Edson v. Lucas, 40 Fed. (2d) 398.
Heretofore it has been assumed that a general bank deposit like the one
in the instant case is a good subject of gift but the deposit admittedly sets
up a debtor creditor relationship, which debt is not a subject of gift inter
vivos. 2 Ind. L. J. 178-79. This being true, the instant case is again given
support. While the bank deposit is not a subject of gift, it is pointed out
that a trust, assignment (if power to reduce to possession is exercised before
death of the assignor), or contract in favor of the donee as a beneficiary
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will accomplish the same result as was intended to be accomplished in the
instant case by the invalid gift. 2 Ind. L. J. 178 and authorities cited.
The decision of the instant case with the considerations here mentioned
would indicate that the case of Ogden v. Washington NationalBank, supra,
which can not be distinguished on its facts, is incorrect, which conclusion
vindicates the sharp criticism of that case in a former issue of this Journal.
J. B. E.
See 2 Ind. L. J. 178.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-PEAFABLE REENTRY-On October 26, 1926,
plaintiff and defendant, Jessewein, entered into a written contract whereby
defendant Jessewein sold to plaintiff all the sand and gravel that plaintiff
might remove from defendant Jessewein's land; the contract was for a
period of two years with an option for a third year. Plaintiff agreed to pay
12Y2 per yard for the gravel, payment to be made before -the 15th of
every month. Pursuant to the contract plaintiff removed gravel until January 1, 1927, but has removed none since that date. On January 1, 1927,
plaintiff owed defendant for 465 yards of gravel. He failed to pay on demand, and on February 10, 1928, defendant served plaintiff with the statutory notice to pay or quit the premises. Plaintiff failed to pay at the
expiration of the ten days, and defendant took peaceable possession of the
premises. On October 26, 1928, plaintiff attempted to exercise his option
for a third year, and now attempts to enjoin defendant Jessewein and defendant Snyder, to whom Jessewein has sold the gravel, from entering on
the premises, and from removing sand and gravel therefrom. Held, the
law is with the defendants. Calef v. Jessewein, Appellate Court of Indiana, June 4, 1931, 176 N. E. 632.
The lease was terminated at the expiration of the ten days notice, given
in accordance with Sec. 9543, Burns Annotated Statutes, 1926. Templer v.
Muncie Lodge, 50 Ind. App. 324, 97 N. E. 546 (1912). By the common law
the owner of real estate entitled to its possession, could oust the possessor
by force, and without the aid of legal procedure. 4 Black Con. 418. Hammond Saving & Trust Co. v. Boney, 61 Ind. App. 295 (1915). The English
rule, since 1920 (Hennings v. Stoke Pogues Golf Club (1920), 1 K. B. 720,
and the minority rule in this country is that the landlord may expel the
tenant, who has no right to possession, by force and without process, providing the landlord uses no more force than is reasonably necessary. Cases
collected in 36 C. J. 600 and 45 A. L. R. 313. But the majority rule, and
the doctrine to which Indiana adheres, is that the owner of land who is
wrongfully kept out of possession by another, may gain possession by
peacable means; but if the owner cannot gain possession peaceably, he must
seek the aid of legal procedure. Scott v. Willis, 122 Ind. 1 (1889). Hanmond Savings & Trust Co. v. Boney, supra. Cases cited in 45 A. L. R. 316.
Peaceable possession is possession obtained without force or show of violence. Scott v. Willis, supra. The majority rule is that after a peaceable
re-entry the landlord may protect his possession by such force as is reasonably necessary. Mugford v. Richardson, 6 Allen 76. Gillespie v. Beecher,
85 Mich 347, 48 N. W. 561. And cases cited in 45 A. L. R. 317, and in 16
R. C. L. 700. Although the latter point does not seem to have been before
the Indiana Courts, to be consistent they would have to adopt the same rule.
To recognize the landlord's right of peaceable re-entry, and yet to pro-

